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Irigaray’s Alternative Buddhist 





Luce Irigaray’s critics charge that her attempt to carve out a space for nature 
and the feminine self through an engagement with Buddhism smacks of 
Orientalism. Associating Buddhism with a philosophy of nature can lead to 
feminizing and exoticizing the non-Western other.1 Because she relies more 
on lessons learned from yogic teachers than Buddhist texts or scholarship, her 
work seems to be an appropriation of Buddhist ideas2 and a critique of 
Western ideology3 rather than a reflection of Buddhist philosophy. 
I trace Orientalist readings of Buddhism, including those of Irigaray, back 
to Hegel’s influence on comparative philosophy. Indeed, her analysis of the 
feminine self and nature often seem more like a response to Hegel than an 
examination of Buddhist principles. Some scholars resist Hegel’s reading by 
arguing that the Buddhist Absolute manifests in the indeterminately 
disjunctive and alternative versions of reality and self. Others suggest that the 
meaning of Buddhism can be found in examining its practices rather than its 
logic. 
Like in the work of many Buddhist scholars, glimpses of Irigaray’s break 
with Hegel can be seen precisely when she focuses on the practice of 
Buddhism rather than when she seeks to develop a cohesive theoretical and 
logical system concerning the subject and its relation to the whole. I suggest 
that Irigaray’s insights about meditation could show a way to join the 
philosophy of disjunctive alternatives to the practice of Buddhism. By 
heeding Irigaray’s call to cultivate both the individuated and relational selves, 
I explore the possible fruits of meditating on each alternatively. A close 
examination of meditation practices can also challenge the notion that 
Buddhists move too easily and quickly towards collectivism. Put in this 
context, Irigaray’s work reveals a genuine engagement with Buddhism that 
draws out a useful technique for understanding the Buddhist worldview. 
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Hegel on the Buddhist Dialectic 
Hegel is a prominent source of Orientalist readings of Buddhism partially 
because his interpretation of Buddhism was so far-reaching in comparative 
thought. Nagarjuna, one of the foremost and influential Buddhist scholars,4 
often came to be understood through the lens of Hegel. The emergence of the 
self and the role of negation are thought to be keys for interpreting 
Nagarjuna’s dialectic, just as it is with Hegel’s system. Conceptions about 
Buddhism are, therefore, still tied to Hegel even when scholars engage with 
prominent Eastern thinkers. 
Markers of Orientalism in Hegel’s philosophy are conspicuous and 
integral to his philosophy of World History. Hegel’s description of Eastern 
cultures helped to support his ideas of superior European societies. In making 
these distinctions between cultures, Hegel was also better able to explain his 
dialectical model. Because those in the East—though recognizing some 
distinction between self and nature—do not follow this contradiction 
through, they represent the beginning of World History.5 For Hegel, the 
conflict between the individual and nature is fundamental for the passage into 
society and out of natural existence. If there is no inkling that the self can be 
in conflict with his natural environment, the subject cannot have a proper 
sense of identity or begin to shape the world according to his desires. For 
Hegel, Eastern peoples have a budding nature. “In the Asiatic race,…mind is 
already beginning to awake, separate itself from the life of Nature. But this 
separation is not yet clear-cut, not yet absolute.”6 The Eastern mind is 
conscious of a separation between self and nature but this separation is not 
embraced. Because an individual identity cannot be formed, Hegel concludes 
that Asians represent the first movement of World History but cannot 
progress any further because the contradiction between self and nature is not 
put into play. 
According to Hegel, Buddhists perceive reality in an imprecise and 
confused fashion. Reality remains largely unfiltered for them. He suggests 
that Asians fail to progress through the dialectical process because the 
moments of separation between themselves and the world in which they live 
are filled not with reason but with magic and superstition. Reason can point 
to contradictions and help provide a means to reconcile conflicts in reality that 
push to a new understanding of reality. The tools that Hegel attributes to the 
Eastern mind lead them to dismiss or conjure away contradictions in reality 
through a mystical power. He states, “With reference to the character of the 
people who adhere to this religion, this substantiality involves an elevation 
above the immediate, singular consciousness as it presents itself in magic, 
where it is just the singular consciousness that is the power, [natural] desire, 
or a yet untamed savagery.”7 Unable to work through contradictions, they 
seek unity by eschewing logic and find refuge in the unexplainable. 
Their world is not shaped by a rational process that plays itself out on 
the field of finite beings, as in the West, but, rather, by one being which cannot 
be understood and is detached from the desire of the individual. They have 
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not realized determinate negation. “The skepticism that ends up with the bare 
abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but 
must wait to see if something else comes along…But when on the other hand 
the result is conceived in terms of its truth namely as a determinate negation, a 
new form has thereby arisen…”8 Because Asians cannot properly respond to 
the discrepancies between their own desires and the world, they are at a loss 
and their spirit is of empty negation. They cannot move forward to create out 
of the contradiction between self and nature. With no conception of how to 
move forward, they seek to sink back into nature and the un-individuated. 
While Hegel’s desire to fit Buddhism within his philosophical system 
of being contributes to his less than flattering portrayal of it,9 he nevertheless 
believed that there is something productive in such an idea of nothingness. 
Hegel saw Buddhist nothingness as a way towards grasping the “infinite 
nature of substance in its simplicity and its immediacy.”10 He believes that 
Buddhists are stuck within natural consciousness that cannot progress 
towards Absolute Spirit, which further requires a negation of the individual. 
Yet Buddhist nothingness, for him, did not aim towards atheism but signaled 
an attempt to understand God as the Absolute. The Buddhist conception, in 
contrast to Hegel’s, took the Absolute to be indeterminate.11 Hegel recognized 
the paradox within Buddhism: from nothing, comes everything. This attitude, 
for Hegel, transforms Buddhists into followers of the cult of nothingness, 
which calls practitioners to unite with the Absolute by receding into a nature 
that resists logical order.12 Their meditative practices reflect a nature religion 
that not only works towards a consumption of self, according to Hegel, but 
rather a total destruction of the self in order to return to a divine void. 
Difference does not enrich or substantiate the subject, as it does in Hegel’s 
dialectical system. Instead, nothingness is real and indeterminateness is the 
goal. 
 
Hegel and Nagarjuna’s Dialectic 
Despite Hegel’s assertion that the Buddhist philosophy runs so contrary to 
his, many scholars find similarities between Nagarjuna and Hegel’s 
dialectic,13 especially through the role of negation. Those who seek to distance 
Buddhist philosophy from Hegel’s still seem to rely on his reading of 
Buddhism and even reinforce Hegel’s notion that Buddhist culture is a cult of 
nothingness. Such readings may provide an alternative account of being but 
they do not challenge Hegel’s understanding of Buddhism or ultimately break 
with Hegel’s system. By using Nagarjuna’s texts to uncover different 
formulations of logical unity, scholars continue to operate within a Hegelian 
(and Orientalist) reading of Buddhism. 
Because Nagarjuna addresses the fundamental Buddhist precepts of the 
Four Noble Truths in his “Two Truths Doctrine,” this theory provides a 
resource for understanding his view of existence. Within his pithy 
commentary, scholars find insights about the seemingly competing truths 
about the nature of the individuated self and the wholeness of reality. 
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Conventional truth points to individuation of the self and all else that exists. 
Ultimate truth, however, suggests the interconnectedness of being. He writes: 
The Buddha’s teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: A truth 
of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not 
understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not 
understand the Buddha’s profound truth. Without a conventional 
truth, the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without 
understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not 
achieved.14 
Thinkers further mine this text to discern the relationship between 
conventional and ultimate truth in order to draw comparisons and contrasts 
with Hegel’s dialectic of being. 
Nagarjuna’s phrasing can lead some to believe that he, much like Hegel, 
sought to show the path of consciousness as it moves from understanding the 
conventional truth of self as individuated to an understanding of an ultimate 
truth of a self that is connected to the whole. This reading of Nagarjuna 
mirrors Hegel’s system because negation is the motor for the movement of 
consciousness in grasping higher truths.15 Indeed, such scholarship on 
Nagarjuna’s “Two Truths Doctrine” often relays the importance of negation 
for reaching the second (and higher) truth. Conventional understandings of 
the self and the first truth are points of departure but this viewpoint is to be 
left behind in favor of one that recognizes the whole. Arriving at the second 
truth is only possible by negating the first truth. If Nagarjuna means to leave 
individual existence behind in favor of ultimate existence, then his dialectic is 
similar to Hegel’s in that it moves only in one direction.16 
The Two Truths, therefore, are thought to represent different paths for 
practitioners of varying skill levels.17 Contemplation on the first truth of 
independent being can be seen as a starting point for those who can only 
perceive the self as such. Greater investigation of the self would eventually 
lead to the existence of other independent selves and questions about the 
relationship between these purportedly independent beings. The second truth 
seems to be crafted for those with higher levels of consciousness. Nagarjuna’s 
ultimate truth, under this rubric, is that which pushes beyond the physical 
and towards the necessary relationships between ideas and ways of 
understanding through concepts. Through this interpretation, consciousness 
in Buddhism, as in Hegel, shows again that mind flows one way, towards 
greater enlightenment.18 
An alternate interpretation of Nagarjuna uses logic, or logical 
inconsistencies, to point towards the concept of emptiness and codependent 
origination of being. In this reading, the first truth should be understood as a 
pedagogical necessity for understanding the second of the two truths.19 
Contemplation on the self as distinct being leads us to questions about other 
discrete beings and our connections to them. The relational self, conversely, is 
conceptually dependent upon the independent self. Only after recognizing 
the individuated self can the relatedness be understood. Both the individual 
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and the relational self, much like all else, are empty of independent nature. 
The goal of the Middle Path, which neither denies nor affirms one truth (or 
self) over the other, is to show that the relationality—like everything else—is 
dependent on other things and conditions. Reflections on the nature of the 
independent self, as in Irigarayan philosophy, help us to understand the 
relational self. Nagarjuna’s logic also makes connections between the concept 
of the individual and the concept of the relational self. He, in other words, 
emphasizes relationality rather than the relational self. 
Thinking Nagarjuna in opposition to the Hegelian logic of unity, 
however, can result in reinforcing Hegel’s idea that Buddhism is the cult of 
nothingness. Read in this manner, Nagarjuna worked to elucidate a Buddhist 
Negation of Being—as opposed to Hegel’s Absolute.20 Nagarjuna not only 
negates the first truth and the existence of the individuated self but he also 
negates the existence of the second truth, the existence of the interconnected 
self. He negates existence in both forms, which leads to the Negation of Being. 
There is, then, no real value in the individual self or the relational whole. If 
Nagarjuna meant to use his dialectic to prove this point, Hegel would have 
not been so far off the mark when he proclaimed that Buddhists worshipped 
nothingness. Instead of a progression from the affirmation of self to the 
affirmation of the Absolute, Nagarjuna affirms nothingness as the foundation 
of being. The Buddhist conception of the self, however, goes beyond the idea 
of a self in relation to spirit, history, or the other and makes room for an 
understanding of the self in relation to the tangible body. The invocation of 
the body, much like the paradigm of the Two Truths, is not meant to affirm 
the self as body. Attention to the body can, particularly through yoga, disrupt 
the notion that locating the self requires an examination into the self via 
metaphysical tools that create unity through abstract dogma.21   
When readers of Nagarjuna focus on providing a different logical 
ground for unity in Buddhist philosophy, they often follow Hegel’s model by 
positing truths about the nature of the self and being. The result is more a 
reworking of Nagarjuna in relation to Hegel than an engagement with 
Buddhism. Hegel, rather than Nagarjuna, remains the lead interpreter of 
Buddhism.22 Against this backdrop, Irigaray’s appropriation of Buddhist 
philosophy is not so different from well-known scholars who are more 
acquainted with Buddhist texts. Her focus on yoga, however, does distinguish 
her from other scholars who put Hegel and Buddhism into dialogue with each 
other. 
 
Irigaray’s Analysis of Dialectics 
Hegel’s influence on Irigaray’s reading of Buddhism is not surprising 
considering Hegel’s reach in comparative thought and Irigaray’s self-
described admiration for his work.23 Because Hegel marked the beginning of 
World History in the East, Irigaray shows herself to be an astute reader of 
Hegel by integrating an interpretation of Buddhism into her challenge to 
Hegelian philosophy.24 Indeed, her examination of Buddhism proves 
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insightful, particularly when compared to Hegel’s appraisal. Although 
Irigaray offers a more complimentary version of Buddhism than Hegel, her 
reading of it remains tied to his model. Irigaray’s critique of the Buddhist 
dialectic even mirrors her challenge to Hegel’s system. 
In each, there is an attempt to erase difference, which for Irigaray is 
synonymous with nature. Irigaray believes that Hegel misses the mark when 
he asserts that negation of nature is the first step on the path to recognizing 
individuality, culture, and the Absolute. She, in contrast, believes that a self 
can develop in relation to nature and others and there is value in such a self. 
For Westerners, nature often represents what we share in common. Our 
natural qualities either do not work to distinguish one from another or only 
point to superficial qualities of difference. This tradition of Western thought, 
undoubtedly, contributes to Hegel’s tendency to associate the self only with 
that which stands over and against nature. 
Irigaray goes against the grain of Western philosophical history and 
praises Buddhists for cultivating a sense of self in relation to nature and other 
beings. She does not take this to be a sign, as Hegel does, that Buddhists 
completely lack a sense of self. Instead, she argues that Westerners could learn 
from Buddhists, who take cues from nature, rather than trying to suppress 
how nature shapes the self.25 Buddhist cultures, according to Irigaray, better 
understand breath and the ways it points to nature as the foundation of self. 
Our existence depends, after all, upon the natural act of breathing. 
Furthermore, the air we breathe connects us to nature as we breathe in what 
other humans, animals, and plants expel.26 
Yet Buddhist philosophy, for Irigaray, also represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of nature. She believes that Buddhists negate difference 
when they only recognize the ways nature points to relationality. Whereas 
Hegel believes Buddhists could not achieve individuality because they 
remained too close to nature, Irigaray believes Buddhist cultures would be 
more apt to embrace individuation if they were more in tune with nature.27 
She suggests that Buddhists do not fully understand nature because they do 
not recognize that separation and individuation is inherent within nature. For 
her, nature shows how everything comes to be as it differentiates itself from 
another within a coupling. These examples include sexual difference, the 
emergence of spring from winter, and day from night.28 Irigaray further 
argues that paying attention to natural difference leads us to confront the 
fundamental difference between self and other that allows for a genuine 
relationship to develop. Only by first coming to understand the limits of self 
can we resist the urge to appropriate the other to self and to reduce everything 
to the same. 
The greater point in Irigaray’s analysis of Hegelian and Buddhist 
dialectics, therefore, is to affirm the primacy of natural difference. She 
suggests each system represents a version of a dialectic that works to negate 
natural difference by equating nature with sameness. In Hegel, she sees a 
philosopher who believes individuation comes about by leaving and negating 
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nature. In Buddhism, she finds a philosophy that glosses over natural 
difference and sees movement into nature as renouncing individuality by 
integrating into the whole. She believes, however, that there is another way 
besides either negation of the other or integration into the other. Instead of 
following Hegel by sublating nature in order to arrive at self-consciousness, 
Irigaray suggests that we cultivate two types of consciousness. One 
recognizes that the self is separate from nature, family, and community; thus, 
allowing for individuation. The other recognizes that the self is part of a larger 
community. Westerners, however, tend to neglect or ignore such a self. 
Irigaray’s criticism of Buddhist cultures follows a common Western 
refrain. She believes that Buddhists must do more to cultivate an individual 
sense of self. Only through cultivating a sense of self as different from the 
other, she adds, can there be a better sense of community.29 Otherwise, the 
Buddhist model of interrelation—embracing the other at the expense of the 
self—is ineffective and even dangerous. By trying to erase the difference 
between self and other, the self can encroach, unconsciously, upon another’s 
space and undermine the Buddhist call towards compassion for the other. 
Respect for the other depends on consciousness of difference between one’s 
self and other. Reaching out to the other can quickly turn into overreach and 
domination. 
Individuation, for Irigaray, is not only the foundation of being but also 
makes community possible. She argues that we, in the East and West, must 
foster a double subjectivity that is grounded in natural individuation, rather 
than a negation of nature or the self. A “double-I”30 that recognizes self-
identity and community-identity can and must co-exist but this way of 
thinking and living must be cultivated by rethinking nature and recognizing 
that natural difference is the foundation of being and existence. Her encounter 
with Buddhism reminds us that natural difference cannot be negated without 
paying a hefty price. 
Although Irigaray’s reading of Buddhism helps her to differentiate her 
interpretation from others, Irigaray is not alone in thinking that the Buddhist 
system works through negation. This is a common enough view in Buddhist 
academic circles. Nagarjuna’s Two Truths Doctrine, indeed, has generated a 
great deal of scholarship about the refutation of all philosophical positions, 
including the negation of difference.31 Still, Nagarjuna’s enigmatic 
interpretation of Buddhist principles cannot be so easily reduced to negative 
propositions. He asserts, through his commentary on The Four Noble Truths, 
that everything both exists and does not exist.32 Such formulations do not 
allow scholars of his work simply to dismiss conventional truths about the 
self and reality. A close examination of his theories even shows that Buddhist 
philosophy, contrary to Irigaray’s analysis, recognizes difference and 
individuation within nature. 
T.R.V. Murti suggests that Nagarjuna’s conventional truth or 
conventional nature relays the tendency to see the self as distinct from other 
beings and the world.33 Nagarjuna explains, in much the same manner as 
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Irigaray after him, that other-existence is not possible without first identifying 
self-existence.34 Our first attempts to understand the self are made by 
distinguishing the self from the other and vice versa. Nagarjuna, therefore, 
speaks to the propensity to understand that things are independent by 
nature.35 He intimates, contrary to Hegel, that natural consciousness leads us 
towards individuation rather than sinking into undifferentiated nothingness. 
On the other hand, Nagarjuna also challenges Irigaray’s reading of Buddhism. 
While Irigaray calls for greater awareness of the divisions within nature, an 
underlying message of the Two Truths Doctrine is that the self grasps all too 
firmly the idea of natural cleavage and separation. Buddhists do not so easily 
forget the self in favor of the other, as Irigaray would seem to suggest. Still, 
Nagarjuna diverges from Irigaray because he does not seek to carve out 
greater space for the self and difference but seeks, rather, to find a method for 
moving beyond separation and division without reducing the individuated 
self to nothingness or superfluous illusion. 
 
Alternate Readings of Buddhism 
In trying to make sense of the seeming contradictions between subjective and 
absolute truth in Buddhism, some scholars seek to interrupt the Hegelian 
system by exploring the ways that logic could lead to disjunctive alternatives 
rather than the unity of disjunction.36 A philosophy of alternate standpoints 
imagines the emergence of alternate truths while not declaring the supremacy 
of a particular philosophical viewpoint. Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, therefore, 
cannot unify various, contradictory positions. K. C. Bhattacharyya, instead, 
“asserts a plurality of determinate Truths and takes each truth to be an 
indetermination of alternative truths.”37 Different determinations can be 
logically sound but these truths cannot coincide with each other; they are 
incompatible with each other.38 Furthermore, this philosophy suggests that 
this incompatibility must be embraced while abandoning the need for 
relationality between standpoints. 
Kalidas Bhattacharyya39 further challenges relationality through his 
logical unity of disjunction. Disjunction, for him, opens up the possibility of 
indifference between alternatives. Although Bhattacharyya suggests that 
there can be a rational relationship between Subjectivity and the Absolute, he 
believes such relationality can only occur if one is subordinate to the other.40 
It is precisely the move to unite alternative positions or sublate contradictions 
that leads to the privileging of one philosophical position over others. 
Disjunction, in contrast, allows for alternate truths to arise without the 
necessity to proclaim the primacy or supremacy of one position over another. 
The unity of disjunction allows only for the excluding relationship between 
them.41 Whereas Irigaray believes that difference allows for relationality 
between individuals, Bhattacharyya suggests that parts do not necessarily 
have relationships to each other but, rather, have relationships to that which 
separates them or the exclusionary space between them. Even when Irigaray 
suggests that space exists between two, she implies relationality and 
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receptivity in her description of a proximity that creates space for sharing.42 
Bhattacharyya allows for non-awareness, indifference, and non-interaction of 
any particular other. 
John Schroeder, in contrast, moves away from logic and suggests that 
Nagarjuna means to point to relationality through practice.43 Through 
exposing logical inconsistencies, Nagarjuna draws attention to the various 
non-hierarchal practices that help to develop greater compassion and lead the 
practitioner towards liberation.44 Nagarjuna, therefore, did not privilege one 
truth over another but meant to illuminate different paths that would help us 
better understand relationality.45 Conventional and ultimate truths both lead 
to greater reflection on interconnection. If meditation on the individuated 
self—or limits of the self as Irigaray suggests—and conventional truth leads 
us to grapple with the existence of others and our connections to them, this 
form of reflection has served its purpose. Meditation on ultimate truth, 
therefore, is no better or very different than meditation on conventional truth 
if it leads to a similar conclusion. Reflection on the second truth forces us, after 
all, to wrestle with the idea that the two truths cannot be separated 
conceptually from each other. If the practitioner can come to understand 
codependent origination through either of the two truths, the particular 
exercise is less important than the reflective practice. By focusing on the 
practice of meditation, 46 Nagarjuna’s texts could perhaps relay the ways 
Buddhists allow for meditation on the self and challenge the notion that 
Buddhists care only for the relational self. 
Although Westerners often believe that Buddhists reject the 
individuated self in favor of the relational self, Nagarjuna’s philosophy and 
an examination of Buddhist communities show that this is not the case. “At 
times, one takes away the person but does not take away the environment. At 
times, one takes away the environment but does not take away the person.”47 
The self need not be thought always in relation to all else. Buddhists, 
accordingly, recognize that grasping interrelatedness is not always possible. 
Ingrid Jordt found, through her anthropological research, that most Buddhist 
practitioners realize that they are not able to resist self-identification, which is 
subdued through the meditation on the interdependent nature of reality. “It 
is generally assumed that when the meditation ends, so does the acute and 
penetrating concentrated insight.”48 
Walpola Rahula further explains that desire for self-annihilation is but 
another manifestation of craving.49 The destruction of self should not be the 
driving force behind meditation, lest it become a preoccupation.50 Thich Nhat 
Hanh suggests that meditation is not about strain. “Too much effort is 
dangerous,”51 he warns. Accordingly, when self-identification occurs, the 
response should not be to get rid of the thought but to acknowledge it.52 
Meditation, instead, is the practice of responding to each moment, thought, 
and desire with equanimity. When the Buddha calls practitioners to make 
oneself into an island,53 he highlights how seeking refuge in oneself can be a 
way of restoring peace and calm. 
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Irigaray’s Alternative Meditation Practices 
Placing too great an emphasis on the individuated self, to which Irigaray’s 
critics can attest, can also be a problem.54 I suggest, however, that she 
mitigates this charge by articulating a means to apply the philosophy of 
alternative standpoints to the practice of meditation. Furthermore, Irigaray’s 
analysis of Buddhism helps to bring practice into greater focus while 
dislodging the notion that there is a hierarchy of selves in Buddhism. Even 
though Irigaray insists that the focus on the individual self requires distance 
and withdrawal from the relational self, this does not mean that the relational 
self should never be the focus of meditation. Indeed, she praises Buddhists for 
the cultivation of the relational self. She suggests, instead, that it should not 
always be the focus of meditation. In other words, she allows for moments of 
non-relationality and alternation. 
Though she resists the tendency to collapse the individual self into the 
relational self, her efforts to carve out a space for the individual is more a 
challenge to the Western conception of the self, which equates the individual 
with the male, than an attempt to foist Western individualism on Buddhist 
cultures.55 The greater problem in Western culture, according to Irigaray, is 
not so much that there is attention to the individual self but that the individual 
is always male. Accordingly, the relational self is often cast as feminine. In 
trying to make room for the seemingly non-existent feminine individual self, 
she seems to privilege the individuated self at the expense of the relational 
self. 
Irigaray argues that the feminine self is too often associated with the 
relational self because female subjectivity is shaped by sacrifice and forgetting 
of the self. The feminine subject disappears or only has an identity insofar as 
she is joined to maleness.56 Because the feminine individual has never been 
fully realized, her philosophy works as a warning that women should not be 
too quick to cultivate a relational self. Once women begin to think of 
themselves as a relational self, it seems that there is no turning back or ability 
to recapture the individual feminine self.57 Such a reading, despite her praise 
for a relational identity, leads her challengers to believe that the individual 
identity is still superior. 
By taking Irigaray’s directive to cultivate the individuated and relational 
selves seriously, we can perhaps move away from her desire to whittle a space 
for the (feminine) individual self while creating a space for an application of 
Nagarjuna’s thought that highlights fluctuation. Instead of sidestepping 
privilege or priority by showing the sameness that results from reflection on 
conventional or ultimate truth, Irigaray’s analysis of meditation suggests that 
there is a distinction between the practices. If meditation on either 
conventional or ultimate reality can yield the desired result, the value of each 
self can be undercut. Irigaray, in contrast, emphasizes the difference between 
meditation on the individuated and relational selves. Just as one perspective 
of the self is not superior to another, meditation on only one form of the self 
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is not adequate. If Nagarjuna’s goal was to develop an attitude of non-
attachment through a better understanding of emptiness, perhaps meditating 
on conventional and ultimate truth alternately could help practitioners from 
becoming too tied to a particular form of meditation. Alternation of 
meditation practices allows the fluctuation between the two selves to come 
into greater focus.58 
1) Irigaray’s philosophy hints at such a prescription for 
meditation. She suggests that we must meditate on the 
relation between self and others while also insisting that 
we need to withdraw from the other into the self.59 
Instead of simultaneously maintaining the individuated 
and interdependent self, I believe that Irigaray offers a 
path to cultivate alternate selves. The subject, through 
meditative practices, sometimes works to renew the 
individuated self. Other times, the meditator focuses on 
realizing the relational self. More to the point, reflection 
on the other leads to greater understanding of the self. 
Attention to breath and the natural make us more aware 
of the connection with the other. Because she believes 
that it is necessary to pay attention to the different 
selves, the focus of meditation can alternate without ever 
completely losing touch with the truth(s) about the self. 
Yet reflections on the self need not yield a stagnant self. Withdrawal into 
the self, as Irigaray prescribes, does not necessarily mean a retreat into fixed 
idealizations or be limited to meditations on the metaphysical. Self-
withdrawal can lead to reflections on changes within the self that might go 
unrecognized, if relationality received all of our attention. Without 
withdrawal into the self, change could be seen as simply a function of contact 
with the other. Meditation on the withdrawn self helps us to realize the 
indeterminate manifestations and possibilities of the self. The embodied 
nature of yoga also allows for an alternate meditation on interiority. 
Awareness of the self, via yoga, could help the practitioner to experience 
physical contact with oneself. Complex yoga postures are able to draw 
attention inwards because the touching of the inner body becomes 
perceptible.60 
Such readings may be dismissed as too convenient and illogical but 
solving a conceptual problem between the self and whole is not the goal here. 
These interpretations, instead, draw out the ways Buddhism allows for 
cultivation of the individuated self, which is often overlooked. Meditations 
on individuated objects (a dish, an article of clothing, and even the self) are 
common practices just as meditations that point towards interconnected-
ness.61 Alternation in meditational focus is not only allowed but also part of 
the tradition, even if it is often overlooked. The practice of alternation, 
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therefore, is consistent with the Buddhist practice of meditation and reflects 
an uncommon engagement with Nagarjuna’s work.  
 
Conclusion 
Certainly, there will be those who believe that Irigaray needs to engage more 
with Buddhist scholarship, rather than leaning on insights gleaned through 
meditation practice, in order to properly reflect on Buddhism. Yet legendary 
descriptions about the Buddha’s preference for practical aids over 
philosophical quandaries62 open a space for Irigaray’s work on Buddhism. 
Emphasizing practice rather than philosophical precepts also affirms the idea 
that the fruits of Buddhism can be found through meditative practice. That 
Irigaray could attain such perception about the self, reality, and relationality 
primarily through meditation only reinforces the value of this central 
Buddhist practice. 
Although practicing meditation in alternation may not resolve the 
logical puzzle of the self, such a method can perhaps reinforce the idea that 
cultivation of the self does not progress in one direction. Meditation on the 
individual self does not signal an unenlightened mind, unable to grasp the 
ultimate truth, as some readings of Buddhism would suggest. Nor does the 
recognition of the individuated self, as Hegel argues, represent a movement 
into a more mature stage of being that has clearly, fully, and permanently 
separated from nature. Instead, the self emerges in myriad forms within the 
fluctuations of consciousness. Alternation of meditation can help us to 
approach the self, as island or wave in the ocean,63 with renewed attention. 
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